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ABSTRACT 
A series of experiments reveal that people are more likely to mistake black men as 
holding a gun than white men (Payne 2001; Payne et al., 2002; Correll et al., 2002). These data 
suggest that real-world cases of racially biased object-identification occur, such as in cases of 
police killings of unarmed black men. The aim of this paper is to correctly model what goes on 
in people’s heads, leading them to misidentify objects in these instances. One possibility is that 
people are making the wrong judgment about the object in question; perception might proceed as 
it should, but the viewer may think that they’re seeing a gun due to a cognitive error. Instead, I 
present a model which construes the error as a result of a visual illusion: even though the object 
is a hand tool, erroneous visual processing causes them to have the illusory experience of a gun. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 In March 2018, police shot and killed Stephon Clark, a 22-year-old black man suspected of 
breaking into cars, while he was standing in the back yard of his grandmother’s house. They 
fired twenty bullets, eight of which struck Clark.  One officer claimed he had seen a gun in 
Clark’s hand. Afterward, it was discovered that he did not have a gun but was instead holding a 
cell phone. Clark’s case represents a larger pattern. Statistics reveal that police kill citizens of 
certain groups at higher rates than others. Black men are disproportionately represented as 
victims in the US (Mapping Police Violence, 2018). In many cases, as in Clark’s, officers claim 
to have seen a weapon.1  
Psychologists, furthermore, have experimentally demonstrated that people are more likely to 
mistake black men as holding a gun than white men in a series of different Weapon Identification 
Tasks. In a study by Correll et al. (2002), participants were tasked with “shooting” or “not 
shooting” individuals displayed on a screen in a computer simulation. The people depicted were 
either holding a gun or a harmless object, such as a cell phone. Participants were directed to 
“shoot” if the person depicted held a gun and to “not shoot” if the they were not. If the depicted 
person was a black man, participants were more likely to mistakenly “shoot” them. A similar, but 
more complex experiment run by Greenwald et al. (2003) demonstrated the same phenomenon. 
Participants were told to shoot citizens holding guns, to report safety if the individual 
encountered was a police officer, or to do nothing if the displayed individual was a citizen 
without a gun. Results revealed a bias against black men; whether they were police officers or 
citizens, participants were more likely to mistakenly “shoot” the depicted person if they were 
                                                 
1 Philando Castile was shot to death in his car after being pulled over by an officer who claimed that he believed that 
Philando had grabbed his gun but was only grabbing his wallet. Saheed Vassell was shot and killed by police that 
took him to be holding a gun while he was holding a metal pipe. 
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black. Finally, Payne (2001) and Payne et al. (2005) presented participants with clear images of 
objects which were either guns or hand tools. They had under a second to report the object’s 
identity as either a gun or non-gun but were first primed with a face that was either black or 
white. Participants were more likely to report that a hand tool was a gun if they were primed with 
a black face. These priming experiments will be a significant focus for this paper, and I will be 
referring to them as the Image Experiments to distinguish them from the other weapon 
identification tasks. 
Collectively, the results of these experiments show that people have a racial bias that 
makes it more likely that they will think that an object is a gun if it’s held by a black man. There 
is reason to think that the phenomenon observed in these experiments also occurs in real-world 
cases. Whenever police officers think that a citizen is holding a gun, it may be because of the 
same psychological mechanisms that generate racial bias in these experiments.2 
There are several ways in which racial bias can manifest itself in the mind and so it is 
important to find out exactly how it arises in these cases of race-mediated object 
misidentification. Correctly modeling psychological mechanisms that cause racial bias will aid in 
developing strategies for correction, hopefully thereby preventing further atrocities such as the 
killing of Stephon Clark. Moreover, it can aid in normatively evaluating those that display such 
biases, and it may further our understanding of the structure of the mind more generally.  
The aim of this paper is to correctly model what goes on in people’s heads, leading them 
to misidentify objects in these instances. One possibility is that people are making the wrong 
judgment about the object in question; perception might proceed as it should, but the viewer may 
                                                 
2 Of course, it is possible that police officers that claim that they had seen or believed that a suspected individual 
was holding a gun are lying. They may have known that it was not a gun. However, I am attempting to model those 
cases in which misidentification does occur and I presume that in many cases in which police officers claim that a 
gun is present, it is due to misidentification. 
3 
incorrectly think that they are viewing a gun due to a cognitive error. Another possibility is that 
they experience an illusion; due to a processing error, their visual system may lead them astray. 
In this case, despite the fact that the object is a hand tool, their visual system causes them to have 
the illusory experience of a gun. 
Thus, we can start with the following questions: do officers and participants actually 
‘see’3 a gun that’s not there? What is perception’s role in generating the error of object 
misidentification in the experiments that demonstrate the effects of racial bias? And what mental 
state causes racially biased behavior (like reporting the incorrect object, or pulling the trigger of 
a gun)? Answering these questions involves building a model of the cognitive architecture 
involved in generating mistaken reports and localizing the error to a specific process or set of 
processes. One way of categorizing the possible architectures is by examining whether the error 
generated is perceptual, post-perceptual, or the result of an interaction between perceptual and 
other cognitive processes. 
In this paper, I consider three models that might explain object misidentification in 
weapon identification tasks. I spell out what I take to be the best versions of each model, along 
with their implications for cognitive architecture in general. First, I consider what I call the 
Executive Failure Model, the details of which have mostly been developed by Payne and 
colleagues (2005). It states that in the Image Experiments, perceptual processing outputs a 
correct representation of the object, but one’s post-perceptual prejudice causes them to report 
that the hand tool is instead a gun. Then, I propose a model of my own, called the Illusory 
Percept Model, which says that one’s bias results from perception misrepresenting the world.  In 
other words, erring participants in these experiments actually have the experience of seeing a gun 
                                                 
3 I will use ‘see’ throughout this paper to refer to the experience of perceivers where they have an experience as if 
they are viewing a gun despite their experience being in part caused by an object that is not a gun. 
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despite being presented with a different object. Finally, I assess the possibility that errors result 
from the generation of ambiguous percepts, where subjects, influenced by bias, make judgments 
about unclear perceptual feedback causing them to misidentify objects. I call this the Ambiguous 
Percept Model.  
These three models are theoretically important candidate explanations for the 
phenomenon of racially biased weapon misidentification. In exploring this theoretical space, I 
elucidate the background cognitive architectures that each model requires. After spelling out 
each model, I consider which offers the best overall explanation of the relevant data. I argue that 
we ought to reject the Executive Failure Model on the grounds that it has bizarre consequences. I 
will argue that since the Illusory Percept Model adequately explains the available data and 
because it accords well with current theories of perception, such as Bayesian models like the 
Prediction Error Minimization (PEM) framework (Clark, 2013; Clark, 2015; Howhy, 2014), we 
have independent reason to favor it over the Executive Failure Model. I then provide reason to 
favor the Illusory Percept Model over the Ambiguous Percept Model by demonstrating the 
existence of what I call the Perceptual Resolution Principle. I conclude that the Illusory Percept 
Model is our current best option since it best explains the relevant data, avoids implausible 
implications, and coheres with current theories of perception. 
My conclusion is significant for a few reasons. If weapon misidentification is caused by a 
post-perceptual error, then the issue could be solved by teaching people to have correct beliefs 
about the world; ridding of stereotypes that influence judgment will fix this particular 
manifestation of racial bias. However, if the issue is with perceptual processing, then it might not 
be so simple. The model that I defend suggests that observed bias can occur independent of the 
content of one’s beliefs (implicit or explicit). Moreover, if the Illusory Percept Model is right, 
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questions arise regarding whether these illusions are inevitable for those whose visual systems 
are already disposed to generate such errors. I consider the implications of the Illusory Percept 
Model for training and preventing instances of such illusions. I also explore some of this 
epistemological and ethical issues raised by my conclusion. 
2 EXECUTIVE FAILURE MODEL 
In this section, I introduce what I call the Executive Failure Model. Roughly, this model 
states that there exist two separate processing streams – perceptual processing and a stereotyping 
process. One might suspect that if someone mistakenly believes that a black man is holding a 
weapon whenever they are instead holding a harmless object, something must be going wrong 
with their visual system – they’re just seeing the world wrong. Instead, this model suggests that 
this isn’t necessarily the case. Their visual system is working just fine, but a process in their 
mind that automatically and involuntarily stereotypes causes them to report that the object is a 
weapon due to bias that results from the stereotyping process. 
Recall that in the Image Experiments, subjects are told that they are to identify an object 
as a gun or non-gun, and are then presented with the object. Given the simplicity of the task – 
being presented with a clear image and identifying it – it’s shocking that errors are so prevalent. 
Nevertheless, participants are more likely to report that hand tools are guns if primed with a 
black face. The Executive Failure Model posits the presence of an automatic stereotyping 
process that’s largely independent of perceptual processing to explain this phenomenon. 
  According to this model, for a participant to successfully report the identity of an object 
in any of these experiments will depend on whether she can rely on her perceptual system and 
exclude processes that generate racial stereotypes. One might picture two subprocesses in the 
head competing for influence over behavior. If one’s behavior is controlled by their stereotyping 
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process rather than their perceptual system, it is due to a failure of executive control – the 
process responsible for planning and executing actions that are in line with one’s goals (Payne, 
2004). Executive control includes the ability to select for information that is relevant for 
completing the task at hand. In this case, allowing the stereotyping process to factor into one’s 
behavior is not conducive to successful object identification. Thus, object misidentification 
results from a post-perceptual error where the executive function fails to stop stereotyping from 
playing a role in action, such as reporting the identity of an object. In what follows, I spell out 
the Executive Failure Model in more detail. 
2.1 Stereotypes 
Racial stereotypes4 are an example of how an adaptive and valuable cognitive process can 
go awry, leading to detrimental effects. Many, if not most, instances of “stereotyping” are helpful 
and rational. However, whenever it comes to social cognition, they can be not only misleading 
and irrational, but they can have pernicious consequences at the individual and societal levels. 
Consider the ease with which our cognitive systems identify objects in the world, 
subsuming them under categories and attributing features to them based on their apparent 
category membership. The latter tendency is the origin of stereotypes. Whenever we encounter a 
new object that shares apparent similarities with other objects that we know some things about, 
we often unconsciously assume that this new object shares some other features with those objects 
                                                 
4 In this section, I refer often to a stereotype process as if stereotyping or bias can be associated with one particular 
mechanism. This is a gross idealization. Mechanisms responsible for overrating the size of black men compared to 
white men may be different than those responsible for observed bias in the Weapon Identification Task (Wilson et 
al., 2017). Notably, one’s scores on the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald et al., 1998) did not correlate with 
one’s performance on Payne’s Weapon Identification Task (Mandelbaum 2014, 3). The mechanisms underlying 
implicit bias as it manifests in behavior may be disparate and complex. For example, out-group prejudices likely 
play a role in racial bias. It would be surprising if the mechanisms responsible for out-group bias are the same 
mechanisms responsible for specific stereotype judgments of ethnic groups. In the Executive Failure Model, the 
mechanism responsible for bias in the Weapon Identification Task is a distinct process from perception. Thus, 
whenever I refer to “distinct stereotyping process”, it is only for the sake of convenience; I mean to refer to whatever 
collection of cognitive processes are responsible for producing bias. 
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as well. For instance, if we encounter a metal object of a particular shape with four tires, we will 
automatically take for granted that it contains an engine, is being operated by the person inside, 
that it requires gasoline, etc. If we see a small animal with four legs, beady eyes, and a bushy tail, 
we assume that it eats nuts and is capable of climbing trees. The process responsible for sorting 
the world in this way proceeds automatically and unconsciously. It allows creatures like us to 
make sense of the world by inferring features of available opportunities for action and it operates 
without controlled effort. Stereotyping so construed is clearly useful. 
However, this process (or set of processes) is at least in part responsible for harmful 
stereotypes. Stereotypes that are applied to individuals based on their cultural and ethnic groups 
– whether they are true or false and regardless from where they originate – impact how one 
interacts with and view members of such groups (McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005). For example, people find black men more aggressive than white men (Sagar & 
Schofield, 1980). People that seem to harbor no conscious racist beliefs nevertheless display 
racial bias so long as they are aware of cultural stereotypes, an effect observed in Correll and 
colleagues’ Weapon Identification Task (2002). Moreover, stereotyping can become warped by 
in-group/out-group biases. The way that many come to believe that Mexicans are criminals is not 
the same way that people come to believe that cats like fish. For instance, individuals perceive 
members of the out-group as more alike (having less variability among traits) than members of 
the in-group (Linville, Fischer, & Saolvey, 1989) and people are more likely to view their own 
ingroup as superior to the out-group (Brewer, 1979). These two biases enter into the information-
processing systems that generate stereotypes, leading to fallacious and harmful generalizations.  
The Executive Failure Model states that the system in the mind responsible for automatic 
stereotyping is distinct from perceptual processing. The automatic stereotyping process receives 
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information from perception, but then operates independently.5 Behavior is either guided by 
perceptual processing without any effect from stereotyping, or it is guided by the automatic 
stereotyping process.  
Let’s apply this model to the Image Experiments. Participants were to identify an object 
presented on a screen as either a gun or non-gun (the objects were either guns or hand tools). The 
object to be identified was displayed for 200 milliseconds, and the participants had 500 
milliseconds after the stimulus was removed to respond. They were primed with either a black or 
a white face, displayed for 200 milliseconds before the presentation of the stimulus. Participants 
were more likely to report that a hand tool was a gun if they were primed with a black face. The 
Executive Failure model states that participants who are presented with a hand tool but 
incorrectly report the object to be a gun are likely seeing the hand tool display just fine, but their 
automatic stereotyping process that associates black men with the concepts ‘violence’, ‘crime’, 
or something in this semantic proximity causes them to report that the object is a gun.6 
Automatic post-perceptual bias caused the participant to err.  
2.2 Executive function 
The model has given us an explanation for erroneous reports, but there must be 
something that explains successful ‘non-gun’ reports. When things go right, the Executive 
Failure model states that the reason is participants’ successful exercise of executive control. 
                                                 
5 One might think that the automatic stereotyping process is bypassing perception altogether. However, perceptual 
representation must be playing some causal role in behavior. To see this, consider if the stimulus presented were a 
bouquet of flowers rather than a hand tool. Would we see participants making mistakes at the same rate? The 
features shared between the hand tool and the gun must do some work in generating the misidentification of the 
hand tool as a gun. If the stereotyping process bypassed perception altogether, we would expect the same results 
even if no object were presented. 
6 It is possible – likely, I think - that cashing out the mechanism of racial prejudice merely in terms of unconscious 
conceptual associations is incorrect. Instead, it might be unconscious, propositionally structured belief-like states 
(Mandelbaum, 2014). This model can remain neutral regarding the specific post-perceptual mechanism that 
produces the conflict between accurate report and behavior-guided by stereotype. 
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Executive control is the ability to “plan and carry out selective behaviors in a way that follows 
one’s goals” (Payne et al. 2005, 37). Part of planning and carrying out an action is selecting the 
information that will guide behavior; selecting that which is deemed most conducive to the task 
at hand. The emerging picture may be crudely put as a competition between the output of 
perceptual processing and the output of the automatic stereotyping process for guiding behavior. 
It is up to executive control to “selectively gate” the latter so that accurate visual representation 
can cause the subject to correctly report the hand tool as such. 
Using this model, Payne and colleagues (2005; also, see Correll et al., 2002) have likened 
object misidentification in these experiments to erring subjects in the Stroop task. In the Stroop 
task, participants are presented with color words like ‘blue’ and ‘yellow’. The words are printed 
in colored text that is usually incongruent with the word itself (e.g. the word ‘green’ printed in 
red ink). The participant must report the ink color but not the word. This proves to be difficult; 
it’s difficult to stop oneself from blurting out the word rather than the ink color. It’s the role of 
executive function to suppress the automatic impulse to report the word itself in order to report 
the ink color.  
The idea is that there exists an analogy between what goes on in participants heads during 
the Stroop task and during the weapon identification task. It is the job of executive control to 
suppress task-irrelevant information – information processed and generated by automatic 
systems – that might interfere with the planning and carrying out of behavior. Just as one has 
trouble in the Stroop task because one automatically processes the word and thus must suppress 
reporting the wrong information, one has trouble in the object identification tasks because she 
must suppress stereotyping from impacting her report.  
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Thus, according to the Executive Failure Model, the reason some participants err in 
Weapon Identification Tasks is because they are unable to selectively gate their automatic 
stereotyping process from influencing their report, whereas those that succeed in using executive 
control report correctly. It provides us with a plausible picture of how mental operations might 
go wrong when trying to get the world right. In the next section, I’ll present a competing model 
which locates error at the perceptual level.  
3 ILLUSORY PERCEPT MODEL 
Susanna Siegel, in The Rationality of Perception, examines the problem of what she calls 
“hijacked experience” (2016). An experiential state may be formed by irrational inference or 
might be influenced by other mental states such that its content is altered. If either of these events 
occur, causing the state to misrepresent the world, then the experiential state in question has been 
“hijacked”: it’s been influenced in a way that makes it epistemically problematic, just as beliefs 
that are generated from poor inferences are problematic. There are a number of plausible ways 
that perceptual experience can be “hijacked”. For instance, if perception is inferential, the 
inferential process may utilize bad information or bad inferences, corrupting the content of 
resultant experience. Also, other mental states, such as moods, emotions, or belief-like states 
could interfere with perceptual states. We know that perception often goes awry, and there is 
reason to think that often, it’s because conscious perceptual states have been “hijacked”. 
Consider the memory color effect, where one’s “knowledge” of the color of familiar 
objects modulates the appearance of such objects (Hansen et al, 2006). In a set of experiments, 
participants were asked to adjust the color of familiar fruits until they appeared achromatic. 
Participants consistently adjusted the color such that it was shifted slightly too far in the opposite 
direction of the typical color as opposed to correctly stopping it on gray, suggesting that stored 
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information about the color of objects has an effect on one’s perceptual experience. For instance, 
a banana was adjusted too far in the opposite direction of yellow, but a yellow object that isn’t 
typically yellow would be adjusted so that it was entirely gray-scale. 
Moreover, hallucinations can be conditioned into neurotypical subjects (as well as those 
with psychotic symptomology) (Powers et al., 2017). In these experiments, participants 
underwent classical conditioning where a tone was paired with a checkerboard visual stimulus. 
Eventually, the presence of the visual stimulus caused subjects to report hearing a tone. Because 
the participants’ perceptual system had come to expect a tone accompanying the paired visual 
stimulus, subjects actually experienced hearing the tone. Both color memory and induced 
hallucinations show how stored information in one’s cognitive system – whether they are belief-
like states or stored perceptual expectations – can significantly alter how one experiences the 
world: such mental states can “hijack” experience. 
Now imagine that you’re a participant in one of Payne’s experiments. You are asked to 
report whether an object presented on the screen is a gun or a non-gun, and as a result, you are 
anticipating the presence of a gun. You know that you have less than a second to report your 
answer. When an object is flashed before you, you literally have the experience of seeing a gun. 
This is what I suggest occurs. If this is true and we think that Weapon Identification experiments 
have ecological validity, then we should also expect this to be the case for some instances of fatal 
errors by police officers: instances where their biases and expectations cause them to see objects 
such as cell phones or metal pipes is if they were guns. In the following sections, I spell out some 
reasons to suspect that these visual hallucinations occur and mechanisms that might explain their 
occurrence.  
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3.1 Becoming biased: experience-altered perceptual assumptions 
You might have misgivings about how exactly prejudice could manifest at the perceptual 
level without evidence that percepts vary between individuals due to experience-caused shifts in 
the operations of their perceptual systems. Here, I’ll present evidence that environmental tuning 
of the visual system occurs, first by showing that information transmitted through other sense 
modalities seems to temporarily re-tune visual “assumptions”, and then by providing evidence 
that sensitivity to visual illusions is prior experience-dependent in a way that varies between 
cultures. 
It is accepted that the visual system uses stored information to make “assumptions” in 
order to disambiguate noisy input. One example of such an assumption is the light-from-above 
heuristic, encoded in the visual system to extract information about the shape of objects from 
shading. The idea is that the light source in a given environment tends to be the sun, and so the 
visual system takes this fact into account by “assuming” that light comes from above7 to 
determine the features of objects in the world, such as whether a sphere is convex or concave. 
For our purposes, the question that arises is whether the “assumptions” of the visual system can 
be modified through experience. 
In fact, it seems that the light-from-above heuristic can be altered by experience. Adams 
et al. (2004) show that one’s light-from-above heuristic can be temporarily altered if given haptic 
feedback that conflicts with the initial assumption implicit in the visual system. Participants’ pre-
existing light “assumptions” were measured through judgments of “bump-dimple stimuli” where 
they were to report if circles, shaded to appear as if spheres, were convex or concave. Then, 
participants were trained with stimuli that were actually convex or concave where they were 
                                                 
7 Approximately. See Sun & Perona, 1998. 
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allowed explore the stimuli with their fingers, receiving haptic feedback. Stimuli that looked as if 
they were concave due to shading were actually convex and vice-versa. The training stimuli 
altered the spheres to suggest that the light source has shifted either 30 degrees to the left or to 
the right. After training, participants were asked to judge the vision-only 2-d stimuli again. Their 
judgments about the circle’s orientation reveal that participants implicitly “learned” that the light 
source had shifted in the manipulated direction. In other words, assumptions that factored into 
their perception of objects’ shape were altered, influencing the content of participants’ 
experience. 
More evidence for experience-influenced perceptual “assumptions” comes from Bremner 
et al., (2016). The researchers compared the effects of the Ebbinghaus illusion (Figure 3.1) on 
children of the indigenous Himba children who live in rural Namibia, urban Namibian children, 
and children of the UK. The effects of the illusion were significant for UK children, whereas 
rural Namibian children showed a small effect. Urban Namibian children showed a greater effect 
than rural Namibian children, but less than UK children. The hypothesis is that cross-cultural 
differences are mediated by participants’ exposure to urban environments.  
 
Figure 3.1 The Ebbinghaus illusion.  
The orange circles in the center are the same size, despite their appearance. 
 
Regardless of the specific mechanism, the alteration of the light-from-above heuristic and 
the difference in the effect of the Ebbinghaus illusion explained above show that the visual 
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system’s “assumptions” are altered by experience, tuning them to accommodate for the 
perceivers environment. The model I’ve put forward, the Illusory Percept Model, is another 
instance of a culturally conditioned illusion. Put simply, perceptual systems make “assumptions” 
and such assumptions result from the prior experiences of the perceiver. While there may be an 
important difference between “low-level” assumptions such as where light sources tend to be and 
“higher-level” assumptions like the identity of objects given specific social features, my present 
aim is only to provide an existence proof of malleable visual “assumptions” to motivate the 
hypothesis that such “high-level” assumptions exist. There is therefore support for the claim that 
one’s perceptual “assumptions” can be tuned through experience in the fashion required for my 
proposed model to make sense. It remains an open question as to what degree and at how “high” 
of a level such attunement occurs. 
Thus, we might think that there are ways in which exposure to certain events might cause 
one’s perceptual system to become biased by having its assumptions altered based on something 
like skin color. For instance, it’s plausible that exposure to certain types of media that depict 
black men wielding weapons could explain how perceptual “assumptions” become racially 
biased. Importantly, it should be noted that the mechanism through which perceptual 
“assumptions” become biased need not be cognitive penetration. 
Here are two ways that perceptual processing can become biased to produce ethnicity-
mediated object misidentification.  
i) One lives one’s life unreflectively consuming media that depicts black men as violent 
and soaking up ambient cultural stereotypes that black men are criminals, thereby 
forming beliefs, explicit or implicit, that Black men are more likely to be dangerous, 
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criminal, and are thus more likely to be wielding a weapon. These beliefs somehow 
interact with perceptual processing, influencing perceptual experience.  
ii) Through exposure to media that depicts black men as violent, criminal, and more 
likely than white men to be wielding a weapon, one’s perceptual system becomes 
attuned to such features and regularities, thereby influencing perceptual 
“assumptions”. One’s conscious beliefs about such matters has no impact on 
perception’s operations. 
The first scenario is an instance of the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience, 
meaning that higher-order belief-like states influence the operations of perceptual processing and 
therefore one’s experience. The second scenario depicts the biasing of perceptual processing 
without the occurrence of cognitive penetration. Both of these scenarios, I suggest, are plausible. 
It is a matter of empirical investigation as to whether it’s the case that the first, second, both, or 
neither occur. My point is that environmental tuning of perception can operate solely at the 
perceptual level – it doesn’t have to be higher-order states affecting perceptual processing. (To 
be clear, I’m not ruling out cognitive penetration. The model that I’m putting forward can remain 
neutral as to whether it occurs. Having said that, this draws attention to the further possibility 
that the cognitive penetration occurs and exacerbates the effects of racially biased perceptual 
processing, further increasing the possibility of illusory experience.) 
In the next section, I’ll introduce what I call the Perceptual Resolution Principle, which 
motivates and constrains the theory that I am putting forth. I’ll show that there are independent 
reasons to accept the principle’s existence and how it fits with the Illusory Percept Model. 
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3.2 The Perceptual Resolution Principle 
The suggestion that perception would go wrong enough to produce a representation of an 
entirely distinct object is striking. Participants in the Image Experiments are presented with a 
socket wrench, for example. Why would we think that perception would instead output a gun – 
an entirely different object? If there isn’t enough detail or time to process the socket wrench, 
wouldn’t the output just be a bit muddled or less detailed? In this section, I briefly argue for the 
existence of what I call the Perceptual Resolution Principle, which states that perceptual 
processing aggressively seeks to disambiguate incoming information in order to output 
determinate percepts rather than percepts with ambiguous content. 
There are empirical and theoretical reasons to think that perceptual processing outputs 
almost entirely determinate percepts. The principle gains empirical support from the 
phenomenon of binocular rivalry, and theoretical support from considerations about the function 
of perception.  
Imagine that you are looking at an image of a house and face, split so that each eye can 
see only one of the objects. What will your perceptual experience be like? It could be a jumbled 
mess, the result of the visual system’s confusion due to an unfamiliar state of affairs. You might 
see a relatively coherent mash-up of house and face. Or, you might see only one image at a time; 
either a house or a face. The latter is what occurs, and the phenomenon is called binocular 
rivalry. The perceptual representation of the strange stimulus is always a determinate object. It’s 
as if perception attempts to select the most plausible representation given the information it has; 
perceptual processing selects either house or face in favor of conscious perception making sense 
(Howhy, 2013 23-25).  
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The phenomenon of binocular rivalry reveals the imperative that guides the visual 
system: generate determinate representations despite noisy or unfamiliar sensory input. Input 
always involves noise and ambiguity. It would not be adaptive for creatures to have perceptual 
systems that output ambiguous or indeterminate representations since this would only confuse 
the organism. One is better off if their visual system constructs its best guess given the current 
available information, so that the world is organized into determinate and actionable entities. 
Avoiding indeterminate representations will come at a cost, however. Often, the best guess about 
a given state-of-affairs in the world will be incorrect, the result being misperception. The 
evolutionary trade-off is one between having actionable representations at the cost of getting the 
world wrong every once in a while.  
3.3 Inferential perception 
Theorists have long suggested that perception occurs as a process of unconscious 
inference (Helmholtz, 1867; Hatfield, 2002; Clark, 2015; Corlett, 2018). Rather than perception 
being a passive process of taking in sensory information, it is actively inferring the cause of 
proximal stimulation. From prior experience, the brain stores models of the world. These models 
are used by the perceptual system to make sense of incoming sensory signal. In this sense, 
perception is thought to be a process of unconscious inference – given models of the world based 
on prior experience, what is the most likely the cause of current sensory input? The upshot is a 
more active portrayal of perception: perceptual experience is the result of system’s current best 
hypothesis about the cause of sensory stimulation. 
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Inferential perception is often thought to be Bayesian, (Clark, 2015; Hohwy, 2013): the 
probability of a given perceptual hypothesis is dependent upon the system’s assessment of the 
probability of the current hypothesis independent of the current sensory evidence8.  
Bayes’ Theorem: P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A)/P(B) 
These Bayesian calculations, or something that roughly approximates them, are thought 
to be occurring unconsciously within the perceptual processing system itself. For example, 
whether the sensory stimulation that the system has just received was caused by a bee buzzing 
across my visual field is dependent upon what the system considers the probability that such an 
event would occur independent of the current stimulation. 
When viewing a landscape in the dead of winter where the plant-life is covered in snow 
and icicles are hanging from trees, the ‘bee hypothesis’ may not be given much weight compared 
to if I were standing in a lush field, surrounded by many flowering plants with the sun shining – 
a scenario in which the perceptual system may rate insect events as having a high probability. 
Sensory stimulation, of course, is still playing a significant role in the generation of percepts, but 
so are stored models of the world containing probability density functions: a set of assigned 
probabilities for different perceptual hypotheses. Stored expectations take the form of prior 
probabilities (priors, for short). Call stored priors within the perceptual system perceptual priors. 
Perceptual priors and their role in unconscious inference provide a way to make sense of 
illusory experiences. In cases where one experiences an illusion, one misperceives the world 
because of failure on the part of their perceptual system to assign proper probabilities to 
perceptual hypotheses.  
                                                 
8 I cite Predictive Processing theorists that utilize Bayesian models to make sense of perceptual processing. 
However, I want to be clear that perceptual processing can be inferential without being Bayesian. Moreover, 
Bayesian perception need not fit the predictive coding model. I am sticking with the Bayesian model for the 
purposes of this paper. It need not be true for the basic structure of the model to remain intact. 
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Recall that people seem to experience images of grey bananas as slightly yellow, which is 
supported by their tendency to overcompensate whenever asked to make the bananas greyscale 
by shifting the color too far in the opposite direction. This phenomenon can be explained in 
terms of perceptual priors. That a banana is yellow has an encoded likelihood within the visual 
system. If the perceptual prior that the banana is yellow is high enough, then the posterior 
probability of the perceptual hypothesis that the banana is yellow will beat out the hypothesis 
that it is grey. The idea is that this is exactly what occurs in the experiments where people fail to 
change the color of the banana to grey: when it is actually gray, it still looks yellow. This is 
because the perceptual hypothesis that the banana is yellow is given a higher posterior 
probability than the hypothesis that it is grey because of the high perceptual prior that a given 
banana is yellow. To use Siegel’s phrase, it’s as if perceptual experience is “hijacked” by stored 
perceptual priors, causing misperception, however slight.  
Let’s briefly see how this process might play out with idealized equations and value 
assignments. 
o = sense data from the grey banana                            P(Hy |o) = P(yellow) × 
P(o|Hy)/P(o) 
Hy = prior that a banana is yellow 
Hg = prior that a banana is grey                  P(Hg |o) = P(grey) × 
P(o|Hg)/P(o) 
If P(Hy|o) > P(Hg|o), then one will experience the banana as yellow. To illustrate, assign 
.95 to the perceptual hypothesis that a given banana is yellow, .1 to the occurrence of incoming 
sense information indicating that the banana is grey, .1 to the sense information would occur 
given the yellow banana hypothesis, and .9 to the event that sense information would indicate 
20 
that the banana is grey given the grey banana hypothesis9. The result is that P(Hy|o) = .95 and 
P(Hg|o) = .9, which would mean that the perceiver would have the experience of seeing a yellow 
banana despite the banana being grey.  
Bayesian models of perception assume what I have called the Perceptual Resolution 
Principle – perceptual processing will tend to yield a determinate percept. These theories suggest 
that even though probabilities are computed and assigned to different perceptual hypotheses, 
perceptual experience is always the result of the selection of the best current hypothesis, which 
will rarely, if ever, be something indeterminate.  
3.4 The model applied 
Let us apply this picture to the Payne’s Weapon Identification Task. The Illusory Percept 
Model states that weapon misidentifications are the result of illusory experiences where the 
participant has the experience of seeing a gun. Mistakes are influenced by the appearance of a 
black face before the hand tool display. This is because the participants’ ‘gun prior’ and ‘hand 
tool prior’ differ depending on the ethnicity of the face prime. ‘Gun prior’ and ‘hand tool prior’ 
refer to the prior probability that each object would be depicted on the screen in front of 
participants. For one to have an illusory experience where a hand tool appears to be a gun, the 
gun prior must be high enough to render the perceptual hypothesis that the object is gun higher 
than the hypothesis that it’s a hand tool. 
o = sense data from the socket wrench                                        P(Hg|o) = P(Hg) × 
P(o|Hg)/P(o) 
Hg = prior that an object is a gun 
                                                 
9 These value assignments are necessarily meant to be realistic. I am using them only to illustrate the point that 
perceptual hypotheses that are inaccurate may win out over those that are accurate because of the value given to 
stored priors. 
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Hsw= prior that an object is a socket wrench                    P(Hsw|o) = P(Hsw) × 
P(o|Hsw)/P(o) 
If P(Hg|o) > P(Hsw|o), one will see a gun even though there isn’t one. The Illusory Percept 
Model states that the face primes strongly influence the process of perceptual inference – so 
much so that participants have the illusory experience that a hand tool it is a gun, however 
briefly. In other words, prior probabilities are assigned to each component of calculations to 
yield the result that Hg is most probable. Notice how Bayesian inferential perception fills in the 
details of the previously mentioned Perceptual Resolution Principle. It makes sense of how a 
determinate representation may be created even though it misrepresents the world. If perceptual 
processing is constructing representations based on stored information and incoming sensory 
signal, we should expect it to select the most probable cause of proximal stimulation from a set 
of possibilities rather than generating something unclear. 
The Illusory Percept Model implies that perceptual priors are influenced by ethnicity. 
There are some findings that provide reason to think that this occurs. In a set of experiments by 
Eberhardt et al. (2004), an image of a crime-relevant object (either a gun or a knife) was shown 
to participants, at first being severely degraded so that it was nearly impossible to discern. A 
series of the same image, but progressively less degraded, was shown to each participant until 
they were able to discern what was depicted. Before being presented with the images, 
participants were primed with either a black or a white face. The primes were subliminal, 
meaning that they were flashed quickly enough such that participants could not consciously 
recognize that they had seen the faces. Participants that were primed with a black face were able 
to discern crime-relevant objects (e.g. guns, knives, etc.) at a lower threshold, meaning that they 
required less images, than those that were primed with a white face. Thus, the black face prime 
seems to influence perceptual processing in such a way that it causes faster object discrimination.  
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These experiments provide evidence for the claim that primes influence perceptual 
processing. If perception operates inferentially, then this experiment provides support for my 
claim that the black face prime modulates prior probabilities, explaining the effect on the 
threshold at which participants detected the stimulus. The prime increases the probability for 
perceptual hypotheses that a crime-relevant object is present in the world, explaining why the 
threshold for detection of a gun is lowered. Likewise, this model states that in Payne’s 
experiments, primes modulate the ‘gun prior’.  
In sum, the Illusory Percept Model states that participants in Weapon Identification Tasks 
err because they have the illusory experience of seeing a gun. Their perceptual systems render 
the possibility of the presence of a gun more likely whenever they are primed with a black face. 
If these experiments have any ecological validity, then we should expect that in some real-world 
cases where police officers think that they’ve seen a gun in the hand of a black man, it is because 
of the “hijacking” of experience, they ‘see’ a gun due to their biased perceptual processing. 
4 DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO MODELS 
In this section, I argue that we ought to reject the Executive Failure Model. Then I 
consider some objections to the Illusory Percept Model and some empirical challenges. I suggest 
routes for further investigation that may shed light on the mechanisms that cause what I believe 
to be racially biased perception. Finally, I conclude that the Illusory Percept Model is to be 
favored as our best current explanatory model for the results of the weapon identification tasks.  
4.1 Overriding perception? 
The Executive Failure Model states that participants in the Image Experiments correctly 
perceive the world. Nevertheless, the impulse generated by one’s automatic stereotype process 
causes them to report that the world is other than it is. While the workings of the mind are often 
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counterintuitive, this implication is striking. The task is to identify an object based on visual 
information and in Image Experiments, objects are displayed on a screen so that they are clearly 
discernable. Yet, participants fail at their task because of an interfering mental state, one 
generated by a process that takes irrelevant information from the world into account, such as the 
ethnicity of a face presented before the stimulus-to-be-identified is displayed. The pull of 
involuntary associations is strong enough to mis-report the identity of an object. I question 
whether there is precedent to suppose that behavior could so easily be hijacked whenever other 
cognitive processes – perceptual processing in this instance – could better assist the entire system 
in completing the task at hand. If there is precedent, I’m skeptical that it can generalize to the 
case of object misidentification. This would be like being told to identify the object in the hand 
of the next person you see; you clearly see a plumber holding a banana and promptly report 
“wrench!”, or painter holding a cell phone only to report it as a paint brush10. The Executive 
Failure Model comes at this cost, and it seems intuitive that we do not find ourselves pulled by 
stereotypes so as to misidentify objects as this model suggests. 
The authors rely on the analogy of the Stroop task to make sense of the interfering 
process. At first glance, this analogy seems apt, but it is not. Recall that in the Stroop task, 
participants see the names of colors printed in ink that are sometimes inconsistent with the color 
to which the word itself refers to. In the Stroop task, subjects get tripped up in attempting to 
report another feature of the object. While trying to report the color of the text, another salient 
and conceptually similar feature of the object, the word that its letters form, may accidentally be 
reported. In the case of identifying the object in the Image Experiments, participants aren’t 
                                                 
10 These scenarios become significantly more plausible if one thinks that the percept, rather than being clear, is 
ambiguous, prompting post-perceptual processes fill in the missing details influencing a stereotype-driven report. I 
consider a model that takes this shape in section 4. The Executive Failure Model, however, takes it that the percept 
is clear.  
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reporting another feature of the target; they are reporting the incorrect identity of the object. 
Whenever a participant reports that a socket wrench is a gun, there is not a gun in their visual 
field. The content of perception does not contain a second feature that may accidentally be 
reported as in the Stroop Task – what is perceived is simply a socket wrench. Instead, according 
to the model, there is an additional associative process where subjects pick out a different feature 
of the target (or the prime), the man’s blackness, and associate it with something that is entirely 
absent (violence, aggression, weapons, etc.).  
It’s also critical that the proponents of the Executive Failure Model concede that 
perception must be playing some role in generating that a hand tool is a gun. If the hand tool 
were instead a bouquet of flowers or a balloon, I suspect that we wouldn’t see misidentifications 
at the same rate. Thus, the fact that a socket wrench has a similar structure to a gun is significant. 
If it’s playing a causal role in generating the judgment that, according to the Executive Failure 
Model, is the result of a stereotyping process, what exactly is the role? It’s important that the 
proponent of such a model specify exactly how the percept factors into the misidentification. As 
it stands, perception’s role is unaccounted for. 
You might expect stereotype-driven misidentification to occur if perceptual ambiguity 
arises. My perceptual system is unable to discern the identity of the object, so post-perceptual 
judgment draws on prior knowledge through stereotypes to label it as a gun. This is plausible, as 
Stokes and Payne rightly suggest (2010), and as I entertain further in section 5. However, this is 
hard to square with the fact that objects are presented to subjects very clearly, however brief. 
Additionally, in follow up experiments, Payne and colleagues allowed participants to alter their 
responses in case they thought that they were initially wrong (2005). Participants that mistakenly 
labeled hand tools as guns almost always corrected their answer. If the hand tool were simply 
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ambiguous and stereotyping led to the judgment that it was a gun, then we are left to wonder 
how participants were aware that they were incorrect.  
My account overcomes these challenges. The Executive Failure Model suggests that 
misidentification of objects will occur because of our tendency to stereotype associatively, which 
is at least a counterintuitive and striking implication if we’re to believe that this generalizes to 
everyday cases. An upshot of the Illusory Percept Model is that we will misperceive objects 
because of the detection of apparent statistical regularities encoded by our cognitive systems. Of 
course, we often do misperceive the world, so there is nothing strange about generalizing from 
the Illusory Percept Model to everyday situations. Finally, The Executive Failure Model has no 
account of how perception factors into generating misidentifications when it’s clear that it must 
factor in somehow. My account, on the other hand, locates the locus of the error in perceptual 
processing itself.  
4.2 A challenge: corrected reports 
Payne et al. (2005) attempted to rule out the hypothesis that object misidentification is the 
result of an illusory perceptual experience by giving participants a chance to correct their answer. 
After running the basic experiment of instructing subjects to select gun or non-gun, presenting 
subjects with a face prime, the object to be identified, and asking for a response, the object was 
immediately masked so that it could not be viewed any longer. Participants were then given an 
opportunity to change their response without any time pressure. If participants wrongly reported 
that the object was a gun, prompted with the follow up “actually gun or tool?”, they almost 
always correctly changed their response to tool. That the subjects corrected their initial report at 
least rules out that the mistakes are cause by a persisting illusion. However, as acknowledged by 
Payne and colleagues (2005), this observation does not rule out that a fleeting illusion occurs. 
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That is, when shown a hand tool, it’s possible that subjects briefly – on the order of milliseconds 
– have the experience of seeing a gun, incorrectly reporting it as such. Further perceptual 
processing after the mask appears reveals to the subject that they were mistaken, allowing them 
to report their mistake.  
Recall the alternative Executive Failure Model, which rejects the occurrence of a 
perceptual error and instead says the failure of the executive function to prevent stereotyping to 
influence behavior is the cause of error. The fleeting illusion hypothesis is at least as plausible as 
the alternative explanation – the data don’t rule decisively in favor of the Executive Failure 
approach. Here, I present another possible interpretation that fits with the Illusory Percept 
hypothesis. 
 Participants are primed and so their visual systems are tuned to anticipate a gun. In the 
milliseconds during which the participant views the object on the screen, visual processing 
generates a representation of a gun, causing the subject to report ‘gun’. However, as further 
processing occurs, the brain’s hypothesis updates, causing the subject to correct their mistake if 
prompted. Why, a skeptic might ask, would the brain update the response without further 
incoming sensory information? If the gun hypothesis was selected, what reason would it have to 
update? 
First, there is the basic fact that neural processing takes time11. For their results to count 
toward the data, participants had to respond to the stimuli before 500ms. The Prediction Error 
Minimization framework, for instance, suggests that visual processing is an interplay between 
higher and lower predictions at many different levels throughout the visual pathways in the brain 
(Clark, 2015). Higher order predictions about the features of the object along with its identity are 
                                                 
11 Schendan, H. E., & Kutas, M. (2003). Time course of processes and representations supporting visual object 
identification and memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15(1), 111-135. 
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being corrected by lower predictions until the perceptual hypothesis that best explains away any 
discrepancy between prediction and input is generated. Nothing precludes that the process of 
updating perceptual representations continues to take place for some time after a stimulus is no 
longer present. If this basic picture is right, the phenomenon of correcting a previously incorrect 
representation should be expected so long as attention is sustained. Given that subjects are still 
engaged in the task of identifying the object and are being prompted to sustain attention to 
correct or confirm their given answer, it is reasonable to suppose that perceptual processing 
would proceed, however briefly. Thus, the interpretation of the corrected reports is at least 
underdetermined.  
4.3 The verdict 
The Illusory Percept Model should be favored over the Executive Failure Model. The 
latter leaves us wondering why we don’t often mis-report the identity of objects due to 
associative processes whereas the former fits nicely with the banal observation that we often 
misperceive the world. Moreover, the Executive Failure Model is silent with regards to the role 
of perceptual representation whereas it’s clear that it is performing some function in the behavior 
observed. My model, moreover, can explain the data generated by Payne and colleagues’ 
corrected report experiments (2005) at least as well as the Executive Failure Model. Finally, the 
Illusory Percept Model fits nicely with current theories of perception. 
There remains another possible interpretation of the data. One might be convinced that 
the Executive Failure Model’s implication that accurate perception is overridden by an 
independent process is implausible. However, one might suspect that stereotyping judgments 
occur because the content of perception is unclear. Rather than perceptual processing producing 
a representation of a hand tool or a gun, perhaps it produces an ambiguous representation, 
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leaving it up to post-perceptual judgment to decide what’s in the world. In the next section, I 
develop a sketch of the architecture consistent with the claim that perception processing leads to 
an ambiguity as to whether the object in one’s visual field is a hand tool or a gun, causing biased 
reports as to the identity of the object. 
5 THE AMBIGIOUS PERCEPT MODEL 
There remains another plausible sketch of the way that the mind generates the observed 
bias against black men, which locates that error at least partly at the post-perceptual level. It’s 
possible that visual processing generates an ambiguous percept that is neither a gun nor a tool. 
When the object is misidentified in the Image Experiments, some other mental process distinct 
from perception judges the percept with an unclear identity to be of a gun. Rather than 
perception getting the world wrong, it merely finds it to be indeterminate, only for post-
perceptual judgment to conclude that the unclear object to be a gun. This model might relate 
interestingly with the Executive Failure Model: perceptual ambiguity might the exact condition 
in which we would expect post-perceptual stereotype processing to step in and cause object 
misidentification (Stokes & Payne, 2010). However, in spelling out the Ambiguous Percept 
Model, I will leave the exact mechanism that I call post-perceptual judgment to be unspecified, 
since it might take different forms and for our purposes, not much turns on the exact nature of 
the process. 
There are a few distinct versions of this hypothesis. One possibility is that visual 
processing systematically outputs an ambiguous percept, perhaps due to how brief the stimuli are 
presented in the Image Experiments. Another is that bias in the visual system causes what would 
otherwise be a clear percept of a hand tool to appear ambiguous. Bias in the latter case would be 
the result differing prior probabilities for the different perceptual hypotheses, as outlined in 
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Illusory Percept Model. However, rather than one clearly winning out over the other, uncertainty 
in the system results in ambiguity rather than a clear winner.  
Thus, we may have i) ambiguous percepts generated due to a lack of sufficient viewing 
time of the stimulus and object misidentification being the result of biased post-perceptual 
judgment, ii) ambiguous percepts generated due to biased priors with no post-perceptual bias, 
resulting in chance selection of the correct object. In this case, we would still see biased results 
because of ambiguity arising only or mostly in cases where biased priors generate conflict 
between perceptual hypotheses. Finally, the last hypothesis states that iii) ambiguous percepts 
arise due to biased priors and where object misidentification is the result of biased post-
perceptual judgment about ambiguous percepts. 
What reason do we have to favor the Illusory Percept Model over each version of what I 
am calling the Ambiguous Percept Model? One might be tempted to argue against the occurrence 
of ambiguous percepts by appealing to normal phenomenology; our experience of the world isn’t 
often ambiguous and unresolved. Instead, we see definite objects. Even in cases of 
misperception, we find ourselves surprised when an object is other than it initially seemed – the 
shadow in my periphery sure seemed as if it were a cat for a moment, but after further inspection, 
I see that it was only my shadow. It is not often that one has an experience that makes them think 
“what exactly am I looking at?”, and if it does occur, it strikes us as extraordinary. So, one might 
suggest, we have little reason to suppose that ambiguous percepts regularly occur. 
Even if the above claims about normal phenomenology are right, I think this line of 
reasoning fails. If ambiguous percepts occur, even regularly, we should expect that they would 
not be encoded into memory. Perceptual ambiguity, if it arises, might do so for objects that are 
not the focus of our attention. If an object in my periphery is unclear but also unimportant, my 
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perceptual system need not do any work to bring about a resolution and the experience of such 
ambiguity would not be striking nor would it be important enough for memory systems to 
encode it. Perceptual ambiguity might arise for an object that very much is an object of my 
attention. However, if it arises, further inspection through visual saccades or through other action 
would cause the ambiguity to resolve quickly. I hypothesize that if this does occur, the 
experience of ambiguity would not be remembered. Thus, an appeal to phenomenology to refute 
that idea that perceptual ambiguity is commonplace fails. 
Importantly, I do not wish to deny that perceptual ambiguity occurs. If, while looking 
straight ahead, I hold a previously unseen polaroid photograph up in the periphery of my visual 
field, I may be able to report some colors and shapes, but I cannot report to you what exactly the 
photo depicts. In other words, it is ambiguous to me what is causing the impinging sensory 
information. However, I do wish to claim that perceptual ambiguity will not frequently arise 
whenever viewing conditions are clear and when the object in question is strongly attended to, as 
is the case in the Image Experiments. This is an important point because often, viewing 
conditions might not be clear in real-world scenarios in which police officers must make quick 
decisions. In such scenarios it’s possible that they are relying on post-perceptual judgment. So, to 
be clear, I do think that perceptual ambiguity might arise in some circumstances. 
 I believe, however, that there is a strong argument against the regular occurrence of 
perceptual ambiguity in cases where viewing conditions are clear and when the viewer is 
attending to the object in question – which one might think accurately describes the conditions of 
the Image Experiments12. First, recall that participants, after misidentifying hand tools as guns, 
corrected their reports when given the opportunity. If ambiguity called for judgment to identify 
                                                 
12 Surely, it is assumed that participants are attending carefully to the stimulus, but one might question whether 
viewing conditions are clear if they only get to view the stimulus for less than a second. 
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the object’s identity, then there would be no reason to expect participants to change their 
response. This suggests that the object was not ambiguous but instead discernable. 
Next, recall the Perceptual Resolution Principle. Above, I’ve argued that perception will 
tend toward generating unambiguous percepts. I provided experimental support in the form of 
the binocular rivalry phenomenon. Here, I will extend the degree to which this phenomenon 
supports the Perceptual Resolution Principle further. Recall the alternating house and face. There 
is an even more complicated version of binocular rivalry, discovered by Emilio Diaz-Caneja. If 
images are cut in half so that each eye sees a circle that is composed of two semi-circles, one of 
which as parallel lines, the other containing concentric circles, rivalry occurs between two 
coherent circles that either contain only parallel lines or only concentric circles (Howhy, 2013; 
Diaz-Caneja,1928).  
Another experiment by Logothetis and colleagues (1996) shows that normal rivalry 
persists even if the stimuli presented to each eye are switched every couple of seconds, so that if 
one is perceiving a house, currently presented to the left eye, even if the image is switched so 
that the left eye is confronted with a face, the participant will still perceive a house. These 
variations of binocular rivalry experiments lend support to the idea that discrete, unambiguous 
perceptual hypotheses are favored over ambiguity. Thus, the Perceptual Resolution Principle, 
with its independent support, shows us that the Illusory Percept Model is to be preferred over a 
model that would instead suggest that participants err due to ambiguous perceptual experience. 
While the basic principles underlying the Ambiguous Percept Model might explain some cases 
in which perceptual ambiguity arises only to be resolved by post-perceptual judgment, I believe 
that we should reject that it is the best explanation for the Weapon Identification Tasks. 
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6 FUTURE EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I’ve argued that my proposed Illusory Percept Model ought to be favored on the grounds 
that it accords well with leading theories of perception and because its competitor leads to 
implausible consequences. However, there aren’t any decisive empirical reasons to favor one 
over the other. Are there any ways to test the differing hypotheses?  
It’s possible to identify the areas of the brain responsible for representing particular 
stimuli. In fact, binocular rivalry (see section 3.1) has been used to identify the neural correlates 
of conscious experience (Wu, 2018). Using fMRI, we might analyze brain activation while 
participants view a binocular rivalry stimulus with one half being a gun and the other a hand tool 
such as a socket wrench. We can ask the subject to report whenever they are seeing a gun and 
whenever they see the socket wrench. Correlating their reports and examining the difference 
between activation should allow for the localization of neural realizers for each experience. We 
can then have subjects complete the Image Experiment task in the fMRI. Whenever they 
mistakenly report that a hand tool is a gun, we can examine brain activation. If we succeed in 
localizing the area in the cortex that correlates with conscious perception of a gun as determined 
in the binocular rivalry imaging experiment, we can examine whether the same activation occurs 
whenever participants mistakenly report that the socket wrench is a gun. If so, then we have 
strong reason to think that their experience was of a gun as opposed to the possibility that they 
were correctly seeing the socket wrench but reporting that it was a gun due to other mental states.  
7 CONCLUSION 
Until further empirical investigation is conducted and provides evidence for or against the 
interpretations of the current data, the Illusory Percept Model should be favored over the 
Executive Failure Hypothesis and the Ambiguous Percept Model. Current leading theories of 
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perception suggest that processing occurs inferentially, meaning that the brain is inferring the 
cause of current sensory stimulation. This leads to the possibility that the brain selects a 
perceptual hypothesis that is incorrect based on stored prior probabilities. These theories make 
sense of illusory phenomena, providing a mechanism that explains how participants in weapon 
identification tasks may be misperceiving the world.   
If the Illusory Percept Model really does explain some instances of racial bias 
manifesting in behavior, questions arise regarding effective training methods. It’s important to 
note that while the term ‘implicit bias’ is often associated with non-perceptual doxastic states, 
the concept as a general category undoubtedly subsumes perceptual bias. We can look to the vast 
literature on implicit bias training to examine potential effect training methods. In fact, Payne 
(2001) reveals that prompting participants to control for bias moderates the observed effect of 
bias in the Image Experiments. This is consistent with the Eberhardt priming experiments 
mentioned above, in which participants that were subliminally primed with a black face were 
quicker to discern noisy images of crime-related objects (2004). The activation of certain 
concepts may have an effect on the relative weights given to different perceptual hypotheses. If 
this is the case, then lessening activation by weakening associations may be a way to reduce the 
likelihood of misperception. Lessening the activation might be achieved through many of the 
investigated ways to reduce implicit bias, such as counterstereotypes, where people are exposed 
to stereotype disconfirming individuals (Fridell, 2017). Counterstereotype exposure might lessen 
the association between concepts, their concurrent activation, and the effect on perceptual priors. 
Further theoretical support for the idea of counterstereotypes being a solution comes from the 
observation that exposure to stimuli that violated encoded visual expectations shaped perceptual 
priors. This is demonstrated by Adams et al. (2004) where the researchers show that the light-
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from-above prior can be changed, at least temporarily, demonstrating the malleability of 
probabilities deployed in perceptual inference. 
Philosophers need to assess what racially biased perception means for epistemology and 
for notions of moral responsibility. If the world can be systematically misrepresented due to 
expectation-driven perceptual processing, then perception may not be as reliable as we often take 
it to be. The idea that populations might have their visual systems tuned such that they generate 
racially biased misrepresentations poses an epistemological problem. Are we to hold people 
responsible for having racially-biased experience? And more broadly, when are we not justified 
in trusting the content of our experience?  
The first question turns on the degree to which individuals have control over the process 
of perceptual inference. Holding someone responsible for their experience is surely a strange 
suggestion. However, when such experiences arise systematically, are potentially avoidable, and 
may lead to someone’s death, the question must be entertained. Fortunately, deleterious actions 
based on brief illusions aren’t likely to be ubiquitous, but in cases where such actions can occur 
and have dire consequences as in the case of police officers firing their weapons, we must 
consider whether individuals can be held responsible. If further empirical investigation reveals 
that illusory experiences are generated by bias and that training can re-tune perceptual inference 
to reduce the likelihood of such experiences, then it seems to me that one’s disposition to have 
certain experiences is morally appraisable. In a country where police killings are pervasive, it is 
incumbent upon individuals and institutions that have power to take the lives of others to be sure 
that racial bias plays no role in their dealings with citizens, especially whenever such killings 
disproportionately affect the groups that are victims of such bias. The existence of effective 
training methods that are likely to reduce bias generates an obligation for the institutions to be 
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sure that police officers take such steps to reduce prejudice in their actions, beliefs, assumptions, 
and perceptions. 
Susanna Siegel has defended the thesis that experiences are epistemically appraisable 
(2016), arguing as that inferences generally are subject to epistemic assessment and if perception 
proceeds by inference, then we can hold perceptual experience appraisable. When isn’t 
perceptual experience justified? How can we know whenever an experience is the result of poor 
inference?  Investigating the role that imagination and mental imagery play in perception, Bence 
Nanay calls for a naturalized epistemology that examines the reliability of processes that give 
rise to mental imagery (2018). Illusions of guns due to poor perceptual inference is an instance of 
mental imagery corrupting the epistemic role of perceptual experience. Under what 
circumstances does perceptual processing get things wrong because of encoded perceptual 
priors? To answer such questions, the mechanism by which perceptual priors are tuned must be 
uncovered. I suggested earlier that tuning might occur within the visual system, insulated from 
one’s beliefs. But priors might also be influenced due to the cognitive penetration of perceptual 
processing. Elucidating these mechanisms will aid in understanding how to assess the reliability 
of perceptual experience – an ostensibly reliable process that is prone to the occasional, but 
sometimes detrimental error. 
To summarize, I’ve constructed and put forth a theory where racially biased object 
misidentification is the result of illusory experience. Importantly, I believe to have only 
identified one way in which bias might arise. Further empirical work can reveal to what extent 
racially biased perception is a problem and further philosophical work can aid in elucidating its 
consequences for epistemology and responsibility. 
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